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Comment on Hoerger: Early Pilots of
Medicare Auctions Brings No Solace
to Auction Experts
Peter Cramton and Brett E. Katzman
Dr. Hoerger suggests that we should find
comfort in his evaluations of early pilots that
showed that prices were reduced with little
impact on access and quality. Very little can
be learned from the pilots. They were essentially a one-sided test. Failure would have
been telling but success means little. The
administrative Medicare prices were generally high and therefore the price reductions
found in early pilots were easily absorbed
by suppliers. Hoerger’s evaluation supports
this widely held view. Whatever success the
pilots had has little bearing on the long-term
efficiency and stability of the current auction design. The true measure of the auction rests on whether it leads to sustainable,
least-cost prices going forward, without creating any shortages. It will not.

Dear Editors,

O

ur Economists’ Voice column summarized the severe problems with
the current and proposed Medicare auctions. The column was based on a careful
reading and analysis of the auction rules.
Since that time we and other auction experts have studied the Medicare auctions
with theory, experiment, and the limited
amount of field data that the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
has made available. This substantial body
of evidence is available at www.cramton.
umd.edu/papers/health-care. The evidence
strongly supports our preliminary analysis
that the auction program is fatally flawed
and must be fixed.
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auction-based market was introduced in
1998 and operated without incident for
two years. Then in the summer of 2000 the
“heavy load” of water shortages and other
factors arrived. The market spiraled to catastrophic failure, ultimately costing Californians about $40 billion and extended periods of rolling blackouts. The problem was
that the market suffered from severe design
flaws that have since been fixed. However,
the early “success” of the market was irrelevant to the market’s eventual failure in
2000-2001.
There is no debate among experts about
the flaws in the Medicare auctions. All
experts agree that the program is a train
wreck waiting to happen. Non-binding bids
and the median pricing rule lead to low-ball
bids that ultimately will bias prices downward until they are unsustainable. How long
this will take will vary by product and region,
and secretive CMS decisions. For now, the
catastrophe is being avoided as CMS uses
various tactics to mask the inevitable in pilot
markets around the United States.
The current auction rules and lack of
transparency give CMS almost complete

Imagine that a bridge builder is caught
using faulty cement to build a train trestle
and that bridge building experts all agree
that the bridge will collapse under a “heavy
load.” Would the experts accept that everything is right simply because the builder
points out that the bridge is still standing?
Or would they rely on their knowledge of
structural engineering and immediately
repair the bridge before a catastrophic
event occurred?
Auction design is really no different than
bridge design. It is an established science
offering a wealth of knowledge and experience that should be accessed in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of new
auction markets. Hoerger speculates that the
167 auction experts would be less pessimistic about the Medicare auctions if they only
knew about his pilot evaluations. We believe
that this is as likely as the bridge experts
ignoring the laws of physics and waiting for
the train wreck.
The California electricity crisis of 20002001 provides a vivid example of how
improperly designed auctions can appear
successful, but ultimately fail. That new
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discretion to set any price by manipulating the quantities used to form the supply
curve. For instance, if CMS finds that low
ball bidding has led to unrealistically low
auction prices, CMS can arbitrarily raise the
price by discounting the bidders’ reported
quantities. This raises the slope of the aggregate supply curve and brings prices into the
realm of reason. But make no mistake: the
resulting “auction” prices are arbitrary and
unrelated to bidder costs.
Indeed, there is evidence that CMS
adjusted quantities in the Round One
(Rebid) to make sure that one or more large
national providers became a winner in each
region and product. In doing so CMS delays
the disaster, but in absolutely no sense are
they letting competitive forces set the prices.
In sharp contrast, it is straightforward to
achieve competitive prices without playing
the quantity game and sacrificing long-term
sustainability. To prove this point, we held
an auction demonstration for suppliers,
experts, and government representatives on
April 1, 2011. In less than one month, an
alternative auction design was developed,
tested, and shown to achieve competitive

prices without quantity manipulation. The
nearly full-scale mock auction achieved efficiencies of 97 percent, consistent with the
experimental results. The CMS auction rules
result in complete market failure in theory
and efficiencies well below 50 percent in the
lab. There is no debate about whether the
CMS auction rules need to change.

Peter Cramton
University of Maryland

Brett E. Katzman
Kennesaw State University
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